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Psychologists will welcome this volume by Professor Ross, who,
though not technically of their number, has done brilliant work in es-
tablishing sociology upon the results of modern psychology, as his two
former books on Social Control and The Foundations of Sociology
abundantly testify. While Professor Ross's book is not the first syste-
matic attempt to deal with the subject of social psychology, as he
claims in his preface, since that honor, in English at least, undoubt-
edly belongs to Professor Baldwin's Social and Ethical Interpreta-
tions, yet it is a pioneer treatise and as such is extremely interesting
and worthy of notice.
In hastily glancing over the book one is struck, first of all, by the
fact that it is not laid out on conventional psychological lines. It does
not begin with a summary of present knowledge concerning the psy-
chology of the individual, but, after a brief introductory chapter on
definitions, it opens with a chapter on suggestibility, followed by chap-
ters on the crowd and mob mind, then by a series of chapters on con-
ventional and customary imitation, and closing with a brief discussion
of some aspects of social conflict and public opinion. If one expected
that the psychology of human society would include a much wider
range of topics than the above, the first impression made by the book
would naturally be disappointing; and if one was familiar with the
works of Tarde, a further impression would be that Professor Ross
has confined himself almost entirely within the lines laid down by
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Tarde in his Les Lois de VImitation and other works. This latter im-
pression is confirmed by the author in the preface where he acknowl-
edges his immeasurable indebtedness to Tarde.
But it is not due to Tarde's influence alone that Professor Ross
confines his social psychology largely to a consideration of the phe-
nomena of suggestion and imitation, custom and convention. It is
due even more to his conception of the subject. " Social psychology,"
he tells us,1 " studies the psychic planes and currents that come into
existence among men in consequence of their association. It seeks to
understand and account for those uniformities in feeling, belief, or
volition which are due to the interaction of human beings." This
definition necessarily excludes from social psychology the consideration
of social variations and changes as such, social unlikeness and conflict
not due to imitation, and as the author himself recognizes,2 also those
social uniformities due to instinct, innate racial character, and the in-
fluence of a common physical environment. On the other hand, since
imitation is the chief means of propagating acquired uniformities in
human society, as Baldwin has emphasized, Professor Ross is by his
definition confined to a consideration of the social effects of the sug-
gestion-imitation process.
The ambiguity in the use of the term ' social psychology,' as used
both by psychologists and by sociologists, deserves attention. As has
been elsewhere pointed out by the present writer,3 the term is used at
present in two entirely distinct senses: first, to mean the psychology
of the so-called social states of mind of the individual; secondly, to mean
the psychology of the social life (interactions of individuals). Now in
the first sense, social psychology is evidently a part of individual psy-
chology, being concerned with a problem of immediate experience.
In the second sense, it is equally evident that social psychology
is but a name for the psychological aspect of sociology. There is, of
course, no objection to using the term in this second sense, provided
it is understood that such social psychology has the same problems as
sociology, being, in fact, but a section of sociology. It-is, indeed, but
an application of psychology to the interpretation of the problems of
the social life. Fully four fifths of all that is written to-day under the
name of sociology is such a psychological interpretation of the social
life. Only one densely ignorant, however, would claim that sociology
and psychology have the same problems. While the dependence of
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sociology upon psychology is so great that it is properly classed as a
' mental science,' still it is evident that the sociologist in examining the
origin, development, structure, and functions of the forms of the social
life (interactions of individuals) is getting at something very different
from what the psychologist is getting at. Social psychology in the first
sense, then, and social psychology in the second sense are two very
different things from the standpoint of scientific methodology.
Now Professor Ross does not use social psychology in the first
sense; he says expressly in his Foundations of Sociology1 that he re-
gards social psychology as ' the lower story of sociology.' Yet he denies
in the book under review that social psychology is but a name for the
psychological aspect of sociology. He says2 that social psychology
differs from sociology proper in that it does not include the psychology
of groups and social structures. The grouping of men through innate
or acquired interests, the formation of social institutions to adjust those
interests, are not, according to Professor Ross, phenomena to be dealt
with by social psychology. "Social psychology considers men only
as coming into planes or currents of uniformity, not as uniting into
groups." The ground for this extraordinary division of labor between
social psychology and ' sociology proper' we discover only when we
consult again Ross's Foundations of Sociology.s There we learn
that the ' social' is what we get from our social environment through
the influence of the example of others. In other words, Professor
Ross practically adopts Tarde's views that ' the social is the imitated,*
although he emphasizes the importance of ' contrary suggestion,' which
Tarde also would probably not object to. A few sentences further
on, however, Professor Ross inconsistently defines as 'social ' " a l l
phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action
of one human being on another." We say this is inconsistent, for the
influence of one individual upon another surely cannot be reduced to
imitation and contrary suggestion. Can communication, for example,
which is preeminently a social phenomenon, be so reduced ?
Upon the basis of such reasoning Professor Ross turns aside from
the examination of the whole process of inter-stimulation among indi-
viduals and its effects upon social groupings, structures, and relations,
and confines his attention to the suggestion-imitation process, that is,
practically to conventional and customaiy imitation, as alone subject-
matter for social psychology. The working of innate and acquired
interests in shaping the groupings of men or in leading to conflicts;
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the expression of instincts and emotions in the interaction of indi-
viduals, often determining their relations; the breaking down of
customs and conventions by changes in the life-conditions;— these and
similar phenomena he practically ignores.
It seems to the reviewer that, in the long run, there can be but one
judgment concerning Professor Ross's conception of social psychology;
and that is, that it is wholly arbitrary. Social psychology, as a social
science, can only mean an application of psychology to the interpre-
tation of the social life. As such, its field is the whole realm of inter-
stimulations among individuals, all social phenomena, in other words,
in so far as they have a psychological aspect, not simply ' uniformities
in feeling, belief or volition' due to conventional or customary imita-
tion. It differs from ' sociology proper' only as the psychological
aspect of that science differs from the whole.
This notice has been given up almost entirely to a criticism of
Professor Ross's conception of social psychology, because that seems
to the writer to be the vital point at issue, not only among sociologists,
Tjut also, between sociologists and psychologists. As regards Professor
Ross's handling of the problems with which he deals there is little fault
to find, except that his point of view is dominantly non-functional.
His standpoint is social habit, rather than social adaptation. This is
again practically necessitated by his conception of his subject, which
centers attention upon social uniformities rather than upon social
•changes. One cannot help wishing that Professor Ross had read to
as good purpose the leaders in modern functional psychology as he has
evidently read Tarde. Then we should have had a very different
book. But as it stands, it is still one of the best studies of custom and
convention in any language.
